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IN THE SUPREME COURT
O·F THE STATE OF UTAH
MARTIN MACHINERY, INC.,
Plaintiff arnd Respondent,
-vs.STREVELL-P ATERSON
FINANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant,
RALPH A. SLEETER, JR.,
Defendarnt.

Case
No. 8784

Appellant's Brief
STA'rEl\1ENT OF FACTS
This appeal is taken by Strevell-Paterson Finance
Company from a Judgment granting Summary Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against this Defendant.
The parties will be referred to as they appeared in
the Court below. Martin Machinery, Inc., was the Plaintiff below and Strevell-Paterson Finance Company was
one Defendant and Ralph A. Sleeter, Jr., the other. This
appeal is taken by Strevell-Paterson Finance Company
only.
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The record shows that the Defendant Ralph A. Sleeter, Jr., was operating a cleaning establishment in Salt
Lake County known as the Rainbow Cleaners (R. 16).
On or about October 15, 1955, Mr. Sleeter needed some
additional equipment to operate his business. Mr. C. M.
Robinson contacted Mr. Sleeter about the equipment
needed, and on October 15, 1955, had Mr. Sleeter sign the
agreement which is the subject of this dispute (R. 16-17).
The Plaintiff, Martin 1Iachinery, Inc., is a foreign corporation and is not qualified to do business in the State
of Utah. :1ir. Robins on was the exclusive sales representative in the State of Utah for the Plaintiff (R. 14). The
one piece of equipment \Yhich ~Ir. Sleeter sought to purchase \vas located in 11ontrose, Colorado, at the time of
the execution of the agreement (R. 16). Concurrently
with the signing of the agreement heretofore referred to,
~Ir. Robinson had ~Ir. Sleeter sign \\hat appears to be a
bill of sale on eight items of equipment already owned
by l\Ir. Sleeter and located in his place of business at 2497
South State Street, Salt Lake Cit:~, lTtah. (See Exh. attached to Affidavit R. 18; R. 16.) In order to secure the
payment of the one item "Thich ~Ir. Sleeter sought to purchase, these eight items ,,-ere placed on the purchase contract under a heading of '• R.ewrite of Jiachinery in
Plant." These items \\-ere~ neYer moved from the plant
here in Salt Lake Cit~T· The~- ''Tere added to the contract
solely for the purpose of giYing security to the seller of
the one item on the contract as a ''Chattel Mortgage and
St\curity'' (R ~4). TlH•reafter, l\Ir. Sleeter borrowed
$336.00 from Stre,-ell-Paterson Finance Company and
gave them a Chattel :11:ortgage on an item of equipment
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not covered by Plaintiff's agreement, and on the 2nd day
of October, 1956, Mr. Sleeter borrowed $2,016.00 from
the Defendant Strevell-Paterson Finance Company and
gave them a Chattel Mortgage on ail of the items shown
on the agreement dated October 15, 1955 (R. 10-12). On
August 9, 1957, the Plaintiff filed an action to recover all
of the items of equipment shown on the October 15, 1955,
agreement (R. 1-3). This Defendant answered and asserted its claim to the said equipment and sought to foreclose
on its Chattel Mortgages (R. 7-12). On August 21, 1957,
Mr. Sleeter filed bankruptcy and included both of these
claims in his schedule (R. 23). The Plaintiff never filed
its instrument with the County Recorder of Salt Lake
County, as required for Chattel Mortgages by U.C.A.
1953, 9-1-1 (2). (R. 20) Both instruments of the Defendant were filed as required by law (R. 21-22).
On October 1, 1957, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment supported by an Affidavit of Mr. C.
Mardee Robinson to the effect that he was the sales representative of the Plaintiff in the State of Utah, and that
he procured and submitted to the Plaintiff the agreement signed by Mr. Sleeter on October 15, 1955 (R. 13-17).
The Defendant Strevell-Paterson Finance Company submitted counter-affidavits to resist the Motion of the Plaintiff, as follows: Mr. Robert L·. Backman stated that he had
searched the records and could not find the agreement of
October 15, 1955 on file (R. 20); Mr. D. P. Allred stated
that the Chattel Mortgages of the Defendant were filed
(R. 21-22); the Clerk of the Federal Court attests to the
fact that Mr. Sleeter had taken bankruptcy and that these
3
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two accounts were listed on the schedules (R. 23); and
finally, Mr. Sleeter states that the equipment placed on
the agreement under the caption of "Rewrite of Machinery in Plant'' was owned by Affiant prior to the execution
of the agreement and was placed on the agreement as
security "in order to give Martin Machinery a Chattel
Mortgage and security for the Affiant to purchase the
mercury dry-cleaning unit shown on said Contract" and
that the equipment was never returned to

~Iartin

Ma-

chinery prior to or at the time of the execution of the
agreement (R. 24-25). Argument was had before the
Court upon the Plaintiff's Motion of October 18, 1957,
and the Court took the matter under advisement. On November 7, 1957, while the Court still had the matter under
advisement and without leave of Court, the Plaintiff submitted a further affida.vi t ( R. 18-19). Thereafter, on the
8th day of November, 1957, and without giving this Defendant a chance to anS\Yer said Affidavit, the Court made
and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Judgment in this matter (R. 26-30). It is from these
Findings and Judgment that this Defendant appeals.

STATE~IENT

OF POINTS

PorNT I.
THE COURT ERRED .A.S ...~ 1\I..:-\.TTER OF L.A.W
IN GRANTING THE ~IOTION FOR SUMI\LA.RY
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE IS ---~ DEFINITE
ISSUE AS TO THE FACTS.
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ARGUMENT
PoiNT

I.

THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW
IN GRANTING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE IS A DEFINITE
ISSUE AS TO THE FACTS.
Courts should only grant Summary Judgment where
the facts are clear and unequivocal. U.R.C.P. 56(c) provides in part as follows :
'' ... The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any maternal
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law ... "
Professor Moore in his treatise on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure has this comment on this particular
rule:
''The function of the summary judgment is to avoid
a useless trial; and a trial is not only useless (sic)
but absolutely necessary where there is a genuine
issue as to any rna terial fact. In ruling on a mo·tion for summary judg1nent the court's function is
•to determine whether such a genuine issue exists,
not to resolve any factual issues." (Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 6, p. 2101) (Emphasis added)
"The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden
of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to
all the material facts, which, under applicable
principles of substantive law, entitle him to judg5
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ment as a matter of law. The courts hold the
mova:nt to a strict starndard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showilng that is quite
clear what the truth is, a.nd that excludes any real
doubt as to the existen.ce of any genruine issue of
material fact. Since it is not the function of the
trial court to adjudicate genuine factual issues at
the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, in ruling on the motion all inferences of
fact from the proofs proffered at the hearing must
be drawn against the movant and in favor of the
party opposing the motion. And the papers supporting movant's position are closely scrutinized,
while the opposing papers are indulgently treated,
in determining whether the movant has satisfied
his burden.
''To satisfy the moving party's burden the evidentiary material before the court, if taken as
true, must establish the absence of any genuine
issue of material fact, and it must appear that
there is no real question as to the c-redibility of
the evidentiary material, so that it is to be taken
as true. If the nonexistence of any genuine issue
of material fact is established by such credible
evidence that on the facts and the la" the movant
is entitled to judgment as a. matter of law, the
motion should be granted, unless the opposing
party shows good reason ''hy he is at the time of
the hearing unable to present facts in opposition
to the motion. If, ho,YeYer, the papers before the
court disclose a real issue of credibility or, apart
from credibility, fail to establish clearly that there
is no genuine issue as to anY rna terial fact, the
motion must be denied.'' ( JI ~ore's Federal Pract,ice, Vol. 6, pp. ~123-2126) (Emphasis added)
Mr. Sleeter clearly· states in his affidaYit that the
items listed on the agr<.•ement under the heading "Re·

6
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write of Machinery in Plant'' were placed on there for
serurity in the form of a Chattel Mortgage (R. 24). Certainly the following issues are clearly raised by the
pleadings and affidavits filed in this case:
1. Whether or not the agreement dated October
15, 1955, is a Chattel Mortgage or Conditional
Sales Contract.
2.

Whether or not the items listed under '' Rewrite of Machinery in Plant'' were in fact conveyed to the Plaintiff for good and valuable
consideration and to be the sole and separate
property of Plaintiff which could be resold to
the Defendant Sleeter.

3. Whether or not the Plaintiff was doing business in Utah and had never qualified.
The evidence must be clear and unequivocal in order
to support a Summary Judgment (Young v. Felornria
(1952) 121 Utah 646, 244 P. 2d 862 ( Cert. denied 344
U. S. 885); Ulibarri v. Christenson, 2 Ut. 2d 367, 275 P.
2d 170; Fountain v. Filson (1949) 336 U.S. 681, 69 S. Ct.
754,93 L. Ed. 971; Holbrook et ux v. Webster's, Inc., et al,
(1958) Case No. 8724, ______ U t. 2d ________ , ________ , P. 2d --------·)
In the case .Arran Ferer d!; Sons v. Richfield Oil Corporation, ( CCA 9, ( 1945) 150 F. 2d 12), a Motion for
Summary Judgment was denied on an action on a contract where the affidavit showed a conflict to exist. Headnote No.1 of that case clearly states the Court's position:
''Where plaintiff files an affidavit denying prior
agreement between parties and alleging that pleaded agreement was the only one made and seeks a
7
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summary judgment theron, and defendant files
affidavits contradicting statements of plaintiff's
affidavit the affidavits create a genuine issue as to
a material fact requiring usual trial by witnesses,
subject to cross-examination, and District Court
should deny motion for summary judgment. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 52(2), 28
U.S.C.A. following section 723c."
There appears to be no doubt but that the agreement which is shown as Exhibit ''A'' (R. 16) was executed on the 15th day of October, 1955, by Ralph A. Sleeter, Jr. The list of equipment shown on this agreement
under the heading of ''Rewrite of Machinery in Plant''
was equipment that already belonged to nfr. Sleeter and
of which he had possession in his plant here in Salt Lake
City, Utah (R. 24). This equipment was never removed
from his plant nor anything done to it (R. 24). The affidavit of Mr. Sleeter (R. 24) states that this equipment
was placed on the agreement only to give a security to
Martin Machinery for the purchase of the mercury dry
cleaning unit shown on the lower portion of the agreement. It '"·as only intended by him to give them, in the
form of a Chattel ~Iortgage, a lien upon this equipment
in order that it would guarantee the performance of this
agreement to pay the balance. The affidaYit of Mr. C.
Mardee Robinson (R. 18) referring to a bill of sale executed by Mr. Ralph Sleeter on this equipment, when
taken together \vith the agreement (R. 16-17) and the
affidavit of Mr. Sleeter (R. 24), shows that this bill of sale
was taken only as a subterfuge. This equipment "~as
owned by Mr. Sleeter prior to the execution of this agree8
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ment, and this purported bill of sale is dated the ~arne day
as the date on the agreement. The agreement shows an
its face that Mr. Sleeter owned outright this equipment
and credit is given on the agreement for the value of this
equipment. The value of this equipment in the amount of
$3,640.00 was Mr. Sleeter's which he had paid for and belonged to him prior to the execution of any bill of sale or
this particular agreement. The agreement further shows
that if Mr. Sleeter was buying all of this equipment he
should have paid a sales tax on the full amount of
$6,105.00, rather than paying the sales tax on the amount
of only $1, 750.00, which is shown on the face of the agreement as $35.00 and which is two per cent of the sale price
of the dry cleaning unit. This shows further evidence that
it was only intended by the parties that this one item
should be sold and, in fact, the balance of the agreement
is strictly to give security for the purchase price of this
one item. Although the agreement appears to be in the
form of a conditional sales contract, the Court may inquire, and should inquire, as to whether or not this is a
conditional sales contract or, in fact, a chattel mortgage.
This determination is a question of fact which should be
submitted to the trial court rather than tried upon Summary Judgment.
"Determination of the question, whether a particular transaction, is a conditional sale or a chattel mortgage, in the final analysis, depends upon
the intention of the parties, which is to be ascrrtained from their conduct, the attendant circumstwnces, and the terms of the agreement." (175
A.L.R. 1378) (Emphasis added)
9
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The attendant facts in this particular case appear
quite obvious to show that this agreement was intended
as a chattel mortgage and not a conditional sales contract.
The question of whether or not an agreement is a conditional sale or a chattel mortgage wherein the absolute
sale takes place with the reservation of title as security
has been considered by the courts in numerous cases and
annotated in the following annotations : 17 A.L.R. 1427,
43 A.L.R. 1252, 92 A.L.R. 311, and 17 5 A.L.R. 1372. The
general tenor of all of these annotations is to the effect
that the determination of whether or not a contract is a
conditional sale or a chattel mortgage depends upon the
intent of the parties, and as heretofore quoted, this intent
is to be ascertained from their conduct and the attendant
circumstances, as well as the terms and conditions of the
agreement. This question of a conditional sales contract
vs. a chattel mortgage is discussed in detail in 47 An1. Jur.
''Sales,'' Sec, 833. Some of the statements extracted from
that section are as follows:
''Notwithstanding a proYision reserving title to an
article until payment of the purchase price, a contract may constitute an absolute sale. In passing
upon the question whether a contract with a reservation of title constitutes a conditional sale or a
sale \vith a reser\?ation merely in the nature of a
lien, the courts if they take the latter view of the
contract, do not al\vays style it an absolute sale,
but may characterize the transaction, as a whole,
as a chattel mortgage." (Page 14)

"I t soJnetnnes
.
bccon1es a close queshon
· to determine whether a coutract ·is one of absolute sale
with a resercatio11 of title by u.'a.y of a chattel
mortgage or collateral security~ or whether it .Zs a

10
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conditional sales contract with an absolute reservation of title in the vendor, with payment of the
purchase price a condition preceden.t to the passing of title. It is recognized that the determination
of this question is always attended with some difficulty by reason of the narrow line of distinction
between conditional sales contracts and chattel
mortgages, each case depending on its peculiar or
special circumstances. The real distinction between a conditional sale and an absolute sale with
a mortgage back is that under the former the vendor remains the owner, subject to the vendee-'s
right to acquire the title by complying with the
stipulated conditions; while under the latter the
vendee immediately becomes the owner, subject to
the lien created by the mortgage. A mortgage is a
security for a debt, while a conditional sale is a
transfer of ownership for a price paid, or to be
paid, to become absolute on a particular event, or
a purchase accompanied by an agreement to resell
on particular terms, although it is said with reference to the latter transaction that the line between
defeasible sales and chattel mortgages cannot be
marked out by any general rule. In the case of a
conditional sale, no present title vests in the vendee, but his title rests upon the performance of the
condition prescribed in the contract, while in the
case of a common-law mortgage the title passes at
once to the mortgagee, subject to be repassed on
the performance of an express condition subsequent, or the mortgagee merely has a lien on the
property in jurisdictions where a chattel mortgage
does not pass title. The passing of the title is,
therefore, the real test to determine the character
of the sale as absolute with reservation of security, or conditional. The chief criterion for determining the character of the trarn.saction is the intention of the parties as disclosed by the entire
contract, the circumstances attending to the trams-

11
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action and conduct of the parties. The true nature
of the'tra;n.saction is n.ot p·ermitted to be obscured
by artifice, form, or superficial declaration of intention. Such a construction should be adopted, if
possible, as will harmonize and give effect to all
the terms and provisions of the contract. Doubts
will be resolved a.gainst a vendor when there is a
purposeful ambiguity in the instrument designed
to serve his purpose. Conditional sales are not
favored in law, and where it is doubtful from the
face of an instrument whether it is a conditional
sale or a mortgage, the courts generally treat it as
a mortgage, for such construction is more apt to
attain~ the ends of justice and prevent fraud and
oppression, because an error which converts a
conditional sale into a mort gage is less injurious
than an error which changes a mortgage into a
conditional sale. Courts of equity do not favor conditional sales, and they may pronounce an instrument which resolves itself into a security for the
performance of an act a mortgage, although at law
it may be considered a conditional sale. However,
even in courts of equity, the intention of the parties is the principal thing to be regarded, and only
in case of doubt and to prevent fraud will equity
declare a transaction to constitute a mortgage
rather than a conditional sale." (pp. 16-17) (Emphasis added)
'' N ot,vi thstanding a clanse reserving title in the
seller, however, other provisions of the eontract
or the circumstances surrounding the transaction
may be so inconsistent "ith the theory of the retention of title as to establish the dominant intent to be to vest the title in the buyer, subject, of
course, to the lien created by the reservation of
ti tie. In such rase, the sale 'viii be construed to be
absolute. In this regard it ma.y be said that in con·
1~
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struing provisions in the contract by which .the
vendor seeks rights other than the mere reservation of title to the property, the courts are not
astute to hold a contract to be one of conditional
sale, but will hold it to be one of absolute sale with
a reservation of title amounting, at least in effect,
to a chattel mortgage." (Page 20)
The very thing attempted here by the Plaintiff, Martin l\Iachinery, Inc., in taking a deed on property belonging to the Defendant Sleeter is to create a common law
mortage. The common law mortgage is the absolute sale
of the property by the mortgagor to the mortgagee subject to being redeemed according to the terms of the contract between the parties. (See 10 Am. Jur. Chattel Mortgages p. 715)
''Of course, the real distinction between an absolute and a conditional sale is that the title passes
when the sale is absolute, while it remains in the
seller when the sale is conditional. The passing of
the title is, therefore, the real test to determine the
character of the sale in this regard. Whether the
parties intend that the title shall pass is to be determined from the circumstances attending the
transaction, and the reserving title in the seller
until payment of the purchase price indicates a
conditional sale; but notwithstanding this clause,
other provisions of the contract may be so inconsistent with the theory of the retention of title in the
seller as to establish the dominant intent to be to
vest the title in the buyer, subject, of course, to
the lien created by the reservation of the title. In
such case, the sale will be construed to be a bsolute. '' (Annotation ''What Amounts to a Conditional Sale" 17 A.L.R. 1433)
13
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Since each case must be decided upon its own circumstances, as a general rule, there certainly could be no
basis for the granting of the Motion for Summary Judgment when all the circumstances and surrounding facts
of the giving of the instrument have not been presented
to the Court.
''There is no general rule for determining whether
a particular transaction is a mortgage or a conditional sale and every case must be decided on its
own circumstances. The legal aspect of the contract in this respect depends upon the intention of
the parties, to be ascertained by a consideration of
the entire instrument and the surrounding circumstances, and not upon the form of the instrument or the name which the parties may have given
to it. However, certain tests which have been applied by the courts for arriving at the intention of
the parties are considered at length in another
article.
"Courts of equity do not favor conditional sales;
and where it is doubtful whether a transaction was
intended as a conditional sale or a mortgage, they
will pronounce it a mortgage, since they are disposed to consider e,~ery deed, whatever its form,
which resolYes itself into a security for the performance of any act, as a mortgage. This is not
the absolute rule, ho,,~eYer, for it is tempered by
the rule that nothing is to be inferred "'\Yhich is
contrary· to the clearly expressed intention of the
parties. The burden of proof in dou-btful cases is
on hi1n U'ho insists that the transaction was a conditional sale to shou· that such zras the infetlfion of
the parties." (10 ~1nr. Ju r. c~hattel niortgages, pp.
722-723) (Emphasis added)

14
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The agreement between the parties hereto if classified as a chattel mortgage does not give them any priority
over Strevell-Paterson Finance Company. The Utah Code
requires that a chattel mortgage unless the "personal
property is delivered to and retained by the mortgagee,''
is not valid against the rights of any other person unless
a copy thereof has been filed in the office of the county
recorder wherein the mortgagor resides. (U.C.A. 1953,
9-1-1) The record in this case shows that no copy was
filed with the County Recorder's office in Salt Lake
County. (R 20)
It is admitted by the Appellant that this filing statute
does not apply to a conditional sales contract except
where the instrument is a bill of sale which shall have the
effect of a mortgage or a lien upon the property. The
statute covering this particular point is U.C.A. 1953, 9-1-1.
''9-1-1. Requisites for Validity.- Unless the possession of a personal property is delivered to and
retained by the mortgagee, no mortgage thereof
shall be valid as against the rights and interests of
any person other than the parties thereto, unless :
"(1) ...

'' ( 2) The mortgage, or a copy thereof certified to
be such by a notary public or other officer authorized to take acknowledgments, is filed, but not
for recordation, in the office of the recorder of the
county where the mortgagor resides, or, in case
he is a non-resident of this state, in the office of the
recorder of the county or counties where the property may be at the time of the execution of the
mortgage.''
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Furthermore it should be noted that in one of the
'
arguments of Plaintiff,
as presented to the lower court,
he indicated that the agreement, although signed here in
the State of Utah by Mr. Sleeter, was not doing business
in this State since the agreement must be submitted to
the Plaintiff in Denver, Colorado, for acceptance. This
is borne out by clause three of the agreement which reads
In part:
''This Contract shall become binding upon the
Seller when approved by one of its duly authorized
officers at its principal office in Denver, Colorado, ... '' (R. 16)
The rule of law is well established that a construction
of the contract is made under the laws of the State in
which the contract is made. (See Crofoot v. Thatcher,
19 Utah 212, 57 P. 171, 75 Am. St. Rep. 725)
''As far as it is possible to generalize upon the important preliminary question as to the place where
contracts in general may be said to be completed,
made, or executed, the rule may be laid down that
if the parties to a prospecti\e contract are in different jurisdictions, the pla,ce u·here the last act is
done which is necessary to co1nplete the contract
and give it validity is regarded as the place in
which the contract i.s 1nade or co1npleted." (11 Am.
Jur. "Conflict of La,Ys," Sec. 100, p. 386) (Emphasis added)
The Colorado law does not recognize a conditional
sales contract as anything except a chattel mortgage insofar as the rights of third parties are coneerned. The
Colorado Reuised Statutes of 1953 20-1-20 provide as
'
'
follows:
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"What conveyarnces have effect of chattel mortgages.-Except as provided in section 20-1-6 !he
provisions of this article shall extend to all bills
of sale, deeds of trust and other conveyances of
personal property intended by the parties to have
the effect of a mortgage or lien upon such
property.''
The Colorado Supreme Court has held that a conditional sales contract will not be recognized as leaving title
in the vendor as against interested parties without notice
and constitutes an absolute sale as against third persons.
(See Puzzle Mining & Reduction Co. v. Morse Bros. Machinery & Supply Co., 24 Colo. App. 74, 131 P. 791; Turnr
bull v. Cole, 70 Colo. 364, 201 P. 887; McClain v. Saran.ac
Machinery Company, 94 Colo. 145, 28 P. 2d 1009).
The Plaintiff may argue that this contract is one that
is made in Utah, since the installation of the unit was to
be made in Utah, and therefore the Utah law should apply.
The rule of law quoted above is to the effect that the contract is to be construed by the law of the State where the
contract is made. This means that it is the place where
the last act necessary to make a valid contract takes place,
i.e., where several parties are to accept the offer and it
requires several signatures before the agreement is binding, the place of the last signing is the place of the making
of the contract. It is not the place where the last act in
the performance of the contract is to take place.
The Restatement on Conflicts, section 265, provides
as follows:
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''The validity and effect of a mortgage of a chattel
are determined by the law of the state where the
chattel is at the time when the mortgage is
executed.' '
"Comment. The law of the place where a chattel
is determines the form necessary to the creation
of a valid mortgage of the chattel. It also determines the validity of the mortgage in all other
respects, both as between the parties thereto and
as against third persons. So too, the law of the
state where the chattel is at the time of the mortgage determines the nature and extent of the
rights acquired thereunder ... ''
Section 272 provides :
"Whether a conditional sale is effective to enable
the vendor to retain title is determined by the law
of the state where the chattel is at the time of
the sale.''

Williston on Sales, Vol. 2, Revised Edition, Section
339 at Page 322, in discussing the question of the removal
of a chattel from one State to another, states the
following:
''A distinction has been taken by a number of
courts in rases "~here goods are bought on a conditional sale for immediate removal to another
State, and the seller either ships the goods himself or is a ''are of the bu~. . er 's purpose. It has been
held that the courts of the State to ''hich the property is removed ''ill apply its o'Yn rules, though
the conditional sale 'vas entered into in another
State; but there is no g·eneral assent to this distinction, for other court~ apply the rule prevailing
in the jurisdictions "There the conditional sale was
made, although the goods ''ere to be removed immediately to another jurisdiction.''
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Assuming that the contract is one that is made in
Utah, then the question truly raised is whether or not the
Plaintiff has been doing business in Utah such that it
comes within the provisions of the Code requiring it to
qualify. (U.C.A.1953, 16-8-3) The writer of this brief has
personally checked with the Secretary of State's Office for
the State of Utah and has been informed that even to the
date of this writing that the Plaintiff, Martin Machinery,
Inc., has never qualified to do business in Utah as required
by U.C.A. 1953, 16-8-1. This is true despite the fact that
the court found that the Plaintiff was a Colorado corporation "with authority to operate and carry on its business
within the State of Utah." (R. 26) There was never any
evidence presented to the court to the effect that the
Plaintiff had ever qualified to carry on business in the
State of Utah. In fact, the evidence presented by the
Plaintiff was to show that the Plaintiff was not carrying
on any business in the State of Utah (R. 18-19). The finding of the court is contrary to all of the evidence presented. If the finding of the Court is to stand, when in
truth and in fact, the Plaintiff has never qualified with
U.C.A. 1953, 16-8-1, then Plaintiff truly comes within the
provisions of U.C.A. 1618-3 and cannot sue on this
agreement.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Appellant submits that the agreement entered into on October 15, 1955, is in fact a chattel mortgage since the items shown thereon were given for
the purpose of securing the payment for the purchase of
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one item known as a ''mercury dry cleaning unit.'' The
affidavit submitted by Mr. Sleeter substantiates this position, and the Court should have had all of the evidence
surrounding the facts and circumstances in the creation
of this instrument. It is further submitted that there is
sufficient conflict l.n the facts and evidence as presented
that the Court should, as a matter of law, have denied the
Motion for Summary Judgment.
Respectfully submitted,

DEAN E. CONDER
NIELSEN AND CONDER
Attorneys for Appellant
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